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Abstract 
Standards often require the use of patented technologies. Holders of standard-essential patents (SEPs) 
typically commit to make their patents available on "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory"  (FRAND) 
terms. National competition authorities increasingly intervene against perceived FRAND violations. But 
which competition authority should regulate SEPs that affect more than one country? The paper uses a 
very simple economic framework to assess the impact of three main legal bases for allocating 
jurisdiction: territoriality, nationality, and cross-border effects. The findings are negative: neither base 
will implement a jointly efficient outcome, and the relative performance of the bases depends on the 
particular circumstances at hand. 
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1 Introduction
Technical standards are used in almost all industrial production processes. The standards are
developed by standard-setting or standard-developing organizations, and are normally adopted vol-
untarily by firms. The standards often require the use of patented "standard-essential" technologies
(SEPs). SEP holders and potential implementers negotiate the terms at which the latter can
use the patented technologies. But the negotiations can be constrained by the fact as members
of standards organizations, SEP holders have committed to make their patents available to imple-
menters on "fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) terms, should their patents become
standard-essential. The purpose of these commitments is to limit the extent to which holders of
SEPs can exploit the market power that the essentiality of their patents yields. The FRAND notion
is very vague however, and conflicts often arise between SEP holders and potential implementers
regarding the meaning of the concept. These conflicts frequently cause SEP holders to seek legal
injunctions against the use of their technologies, claiming that implementers are unwilling to ne-
gotiate and/or accept FRAND terms, and they cause implementers to seek legal recourse against
alleged unwillingness on part of SEP holders to license their technologies on FRAND terms.
Countries diﬀer in their views on the legal nature of violations of FRAND commitments. In
some countries, most notably the US, it is viewed primarily as a violation of private contract law.
The main alternative approach is to view FRAND violations by SEP holders as possible antitrust
violations (abuse of dominance, or similar). There is considerable debate regarding the appropriate
scope for antitrust interventions.1 But there is a trend toward this second approach; for instance,
the EU, China, South Korea and Taiwan has recently applied their competition laws to SEPs.2
Standards are very often of interest to more than one country. For instance, standards often
draw on technologies that have been developed by SEP holders with diﬀerent nationalities, and
the products involved are very often traded internationally. This would not cause any problem for
the antitrust enforcement of FRAND commitments if all competition authorities would impose the
same regulation. There are reasons to believe however, that competition authorities will tend to
promote national interests when intervening to uphold FRAND commitments. Some authorities
might be legally required to treat foreign interests diﬀerent from national interests, just like the
US Sherman Act does not apply to export cartels. Competition authorities might also be under
domestic political pressure to favor domestic firms, or may be lobbied to do so by private parties.
Another reason can be that countries are involved in diﬀerent parts of the production chain. In
such instances, even if the authorities pursue the same over-riding objectives, the pursuit of these
objectives can lead to diﬀerent decisions depending on the specific parts of the production chain
that the authorities have jurisdiction over: For instance, a country that is mainly an implementer
1See Hovenkamp (2020) for a recent legal analysis of the role for antitrust to regulate violations of FRAND
commitments.
2Padilla et al (2018) provide an overview of antitrust enforcement in the EU, the US, Japan, China, India and
South Korea, with particular focus on SEPs.
1
of SEP technologies might pursue a diﬀerent FRAND policy than a country that is mainly a holder
of the SEPs, even though they both seek to maximize, say, national social welfare.
There have been several cases recently where the international jurisdiction over FRAND com-
mitments have been at issue, and where competition authorities have been alleged to pursue national
objectives at the cost of the interests of other countries. For instance, China, Taiwan and South
Korea have been criticized for using antitrust interventions against alleged violations of FRAND
commitments as a form of industrial policy. In the words of Patrick Ventrell, US White House
National Security Council spokesman:
The United States government is concerned that China is using ... anti-monopoly law,
to lower the value of foreign-owned patents and benefit Chinese firms employing foreign
technology.3
Similar concerns have been addressed by legal scholars and practitioners. For instance, Wong-Ervin
et al. (2016) maintain that some competition authorities appear to enforce FRAND commitments in
such a manner as to benefit their local implementers or national champions. This would be inconsis-
tent with the pro-competitive goals of the competition laws of other jurisdictions. de Rassenfosse et
al. (2018) find that China is less likely to accept applications for patent protection for foreign SEPs
than for domestic SEPs. The notion that competition authorities sometimes use the enforcement
of FRANDs commitments as means of achieving industrial policy objectives, is in line with the
more general observation that there is a temptation for competition authorities in open economies
to promote not only consumer welfare in the traditional sense, but also other objectives; see e.g.
Mariniello et al. (2015).4
When the outcome of the FRAND enforcement depends on the identity of the regulating com-
petition authority, the question arises: Which competition authority should regulate? There is no
multilateral agreement to turn to in this regard, and rarely any other agreements. But this does
not mean that there is a complete legal vacuum, since all countries are bound by the Default Rules
in customary international law that apply to all countries absent international agreements. As will
be briefly described below, the Default Rules identify several bases for jurisdiction, including terri-
toriality and nationality. But application of these bases can often lead to overlapping jurisdictions,
and the rules do not include a legal hierarchy among the bases.
The purpose of this paper is to identify, in the context of an extremely simple formal economic
model of SEPs that are used in an international market, pros and cons of three main bases for
jurisdiction in the Default Rules. Of particular interest is to determine whether any of the three
3Reuters, Dec 16, 2014. www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-china-antitrust-idUSKBN0JU0AK20141216.
4Some observers question the notion that competition authorities pursue national interests at the expense of
those of other countries is contested by some observers. For instance, Bradford et al (2017) examine the European
Commission’s response to the approximately 5 000 mergers reported to the Commission during 1990-2014. They find
no evidence that the Commission has challenged non-EU mergers decisions to a larger extent than intra-EU mergers.
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bases stands out as more suitable for addressing the international externality problems that are
caused by national regulation of SEPs.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to deal with this issue. But there are
obviously several related research areas. There is a very large economic literature on competition
policy in international markets.5 There is also a considerable law and economics literature on SEPs.
It mainly addresses what the notion of "reasonable" license fees should be taken to mean, and the
circumstances under which SEP holders should be allowed to use injunctions against implementers
for not agreeing to the requested terms for using the patented technologies.6 The literature does
occasionally point to problems stemming from multiple jurisdictions for FRAND enforcement, but
then typically emphasizes transaction costs that arise from diﬀerences in legal regimes, and the
possibilities for SEP holders to choose courts that are prone to grant injunctions (forum shopping);
see respectively Wong-Ervin et al. (2016) and Erixon and Bauer (2017). These aspects are not
considered here.
The paper uses the simplest possible framework to examine the role of the jurisdictional prin-
ciples for the regulation of SEPs. It assumes that a product is imported by a country A from a
country B. The product uses a standard that builds on two essential patents, 1 and 2, that are issued
by country A, and with two separate owners; for simplicity there is no demand for the product in
country B. The producer in country B simultaneously negotiates per unit license fees with each of
the two SEP holders. The holders of these SEPs are bound by FRAND commitments to accept
"reasonable" fees.
In each country there is national competition authority that, depending on the allocation of
jurisdiction, may decide to intervene to enforce FRAND commitment(s). The authority in country
A, denoted CA, is concerned with consumer welfare. But it also puts a value on the revenue that
its SEP holder(s) obtains, this being a short-hand for incentive eﬀects on innovation. The objective
function of the competition authority in country A is thus a weighted sum of consumer surplus,
and the license revenue of the country A SEP holder(s), if any. There is no consumption taking
place in country B, but CB, its national competition authority, may still want to enforce FRAND
commitments since it is concerned with the license revenue(s) of the country B patent holder(s), if
any, and possibly also the profit of its exporter. We might thus think of country B as say China
or Korea, countries with large export interests, and country A as the EU or the US, say. Each
competition authority will view a per unit license fee to be "reasonable" in the sense of the FRAND
notion if it balances the authority’s trade-oﬀ between protection of the interests of the domestic
SEP holder(s), and other objectives it has.
5Garcia et al (2018) is a recent contribution to the formal analysis of national competition policy enforcement
in international markets. Mariniello et al (2015) discuss the consequences of regulatory capture among competition
authorities for international economic integration.
6See e.g. Contreras (2019) for a survey of the literature on standard-setting organizations. Formal analyses of the
FRAND notion are undertaken by e.g. Choi (2014), Froeb et al (2012), Langus et al (2013), and Lerner and Tirole
(2015). Layne-Farrar (2017) provides an overview of the economic literature on SEPs. These papers do not focus on
international/jurisdictional issues, however.
3
International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents
The interaction takes place in three stages. In the first stage the competition authorities simul-
taneously lay down FRAND policies for the patent(s) for which they have jurisdiction. Since the
authorities can only intervene against exploitation of market power by the SEP holders, they can-
not implement higher per unit royalty fees that the SEP holders and the producer would negotiate,
should they want this. The authorities can only impose upper limits on permissible negotiated fees.
If the competition authorities impose diﬀerently stringent constraints on the same license fee, the
SEP owner will follow the more stringent regulation, in order to comply with both authorities’ regu-
lations. In the second stage there are simultaneous separate negotiations between the producer and
each of the two SEP owners regarding the per unit royalty fees. These negotiations are interrelated,
since the surplus that can be divided between each of the SEP holders and the producer, will be
adversely aﬀected by the license fee that they expect to be agreed upon between the producer and
the other SEP holder. To formally capture this, the outcome is assumed to be a "Nash-in-Nash"
equilibrium, as in Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,b).7 In the final stage there is production and con-
sumption in standard fashion. The assumption that the FRAND enforcement is determined before
the negotiations over the license fees is meant to capture the long-run aspects of the enforcement
of FRAND commitments. For some of the cases to be considered it does not matter whether the
regulation is laid down before or after the negotiations over the license fees, but for other it would
matter.
There are two critical assumption in the paper. The first is that national competition authorities
are only concerned with the welfare of their domestic agents, their innovator(s), consumers, or
producers, but disregard any eﬀects from their decision on the partner country. This implies that
the outcome with national enforcement of the FRAND commitments will in general be ineﬃcient
from the perspective of the competition authorities joint objectives, the sum of their objective
functions. The second basic assumption is that when a FRAND commitment is regulated by both
competition authorities, the SEP holder will comply with the most stringent of the regulations that
are imposed upon the negotiation. Combined with the former assumption, this implies a tendency
toward over-regulation absent any rules on jurisdiction.
The stage is thus set to address the question of whether the Default Rules in customary inter-
national law can help steer the countries toward a jointly better outcome compared to the outcome
when the authorities make unilateral decisions regarding whether to regulate. The paper focuses
primarily on the Territoriality and the Nationality Principles, and to a lesser extent on the Ef-
fects Principle. The Territoriality Principle gives countries jurisdiction over acts, actors or objects
within their territories; the Nationality Principle gives countries jurisdiction over their nationals
irrespective of territorial aspects; and the Eﬀects Principle gives jurisdiction based on cross-border
eﬀects regardless of the nationality of the acts, actors or objects involved. The paper also considers
7Our model share certain basic features with the more elaborate dynamic model with endogenously determined
research and development, inventor-producer bilateral bargaining, and subsequent Bertrand product market compe-
tition, developed by Spulber (2019).
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the interaction between these principles and a National Treatment obligation. The latter provi-
sion may form part of a trade agreement between the countries, or could potentially be part of an
international agreement on FRAND regulation.
The analysis to follow will be somewhat taxonomic. First, it will cover three bases for jurisdiction
in the Default Rules as well as a couple of versions of a National Treatment provision. The three
jurisdictional bases can in turn be applied to acts, actors, and objects. There are reasons to believe
that the regulatory outcome that follows from the diﬀerent legal constellations depend on the pattern
of ownership of the SEPs. The analysis will therefore consider three cases in this regard: where
both SEP holders are country A nationals, where both are country B nationals, and where one of
the owners is a national of country A and the other of country B. Each of these ownership patterns
captures a qualitatively diﬀerent aspect of the interaction between the competition authorities.
These diﬀerent aspects produce a very large number of cases to potentially consider. But as it turns
out, many of them are not of practical interest.
A general finding from the analysis is that neither of the three examined bases for jurisdiction
in the Default Rules will implement an eﬃcient outcome, and will normally not do so even if
complemented with a National Treatment provision. Furthermore, it does not seem possible to
establish a robust hierarchy among the bases with regard to their performance from a joint welfare
perspective. Allocating jurisdiction according to either of the bases in the Default Rules will only
improve joint welfare to the extent that the country that is designated to have jurisdiction over
a particular FRAND commitment prefers a more lenient regulation. However, when jurisdiction
is allocated to the competition authority preferring a more lenient treatment, it will disregard
the international repercussions of its decisions. As a result, the Territoriality Principle gives too
weak enforcement of FRAND commitment(s) when the patent(s) is (are) owned by nationals of
the country that has issued the patents, and too stringent enforcement when they are owned by
foreign interests. Second, the Nationality Principle gives too lenient enforcement for all patterns of
ownership of the patents. Finally, the Eﬀects Principle give too stringent enforcement regardless of
ownership pattern.
Two more general observation emerge from the above findings:
• When the Default Rules yield jurisdictions that are not overlapping, there will be too le-
nient enforcement of the regulating SEPs of the regulating country (-ies), and too stringent
regulation of the other SEPs.
• Whenever jurisdiction is overlapping, the FRAND regulation will be too will be too strict.
The Default Rules thus have clear drawbacks as a means of allocating jurisdiction with regard
to the FRAND regulation in two respects: First, none of the bases for jurisdiction in the Default
Rules will normally implement an eﬃcient outcome. Second, it does not seem possible to identify a
hierarchy for the performance of the diﬀerent bases. These findings are not surprising, considering
5
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that the rules did not emerge to solve jurisdictional problems with regard to FRAND enforcement.
But findings are nevertheless of interest, since countries are typically bound by the Default Rules
absent international agreements. The ineﬀectiveness of the rules suggests a need for some form of
international agreement. But as will be briefly discussed towards the end of the paper, it is not
clear what could be agreed upon in practice.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section gives a brief description of the
Default Rules for international jurisdiction. Section 3 lays out the simple economic model. Section
4 derives and compares the outcomes with the three main bases for jurisdiction in the Defaults
Rules. Section 5 considers implications of imposing a National Treatment obligation on the parties.
Section 6 summarizes the findings, and discusses some alternatives to relying on the Default Rules.
The Appendix uses the simplest possible linear version of the already very simple model to show
the inherent ambiguity of the joint welfare comparisons of the diﬀerent jurisdictional regimes.
2 The Default Rules for jurisdiction in customary international
law
There is no multilateral treaty on the allocation of jurisdiction for antitrust. All countries are
therefore bound by the customary international law rules regarding jurisdiction, often referred to as
the "Default Rules" for jurisdiction.8 ,9 Being customary, these rules are not codified in any generally
agreed-upon text. But a widely accepted interpretation of these rules is the series of Restatements
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States by the American Law Institute (ALI).10 In what
follows, we will draw on the very recent Restatement ALI (2018) to briefly describe main features
of current jurisdictional rules in customary international law.11
There are three forms of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction to prescribe gives a country authority to make
laws that apply to actors, acts or objects. Jurisdiction to adjudicate allows the country to apply its
laws. Jurisdiction to enforce allows a state to intervene to induce compliance with laws. These are
clearly separate aspects of jurisdiction. But we will not distinguish between these aspects in what
follows. We will instead assume that if a competition authority has jurisdiction to prescribe, it also
has jurisdiction to adjudicate and enforce, this being the prime case of interest from an economic
perspective.
8Customary international law is formed when states act in a consistent fashion out of a sense of obligation. It
applies to international relations in instances where there is no international treaty governing the relationship. The
exception is if a country has persistently objected to a custom. But this does not appear to be of practical relevance
to SEPs.
9The basic rules concerning jurisdiction were spelled out in the classic "Lotus judgment" in 1927 by the Permanent
Court of International Justice (the predecessor of the International Court of Justice).
10The ALI was founded in 1923 and its membership consists of 3 000 leading US legal scholars and professionals.
ALI Restatements seek to clarify the state of the law for US courts, and are often used by courts as authoritative
interpretation of the law.
11See also Lundstedt (2016) for a comprehensive description and analysis of jurisdictional principles, in particular
as they apply to intellectual property law.
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In order for a state to have jurisdiction to prescribe there must be a "genuine connection"
between the subject of the regulation and the state seeking to regulate. Such a connection might
stem from one or several bases:12
• Territoriality Principle: The oldest, most frequently used, and least controversial base is that
a state can regulate actors, acts and objects within its geographic territory;
• Active-Nationality Principle: Another base with a long tradition is the nationality of actors
for acts committed outside its territory;
• Eﬀects Principle (or Doctrine): A more controversial, but increasingly common, base is eﬀects
that emanate outside a state’s territory but have (or are intended to have) substantial eﬀect
within the state’s territory. This base is particularly commonly referred to in the area of
antitrust; and
• Passive-Nationality Principle: Another controversial but increasingly common justification for
regulating conduct outside a state’s territory is to protect domestic nationals against harm.
This list is not exhaustive, but probably includes the bases of main interest with regard to SEPs.
A central feature of the Default Rules is that they simultaneously can give jurisdiction to more
than one party. For instance, in the case of SEPs, the territorial applicability of a patent, and the
nationality of the holder of the patent, might point in diﬀerent directions with regard to which party
should have jurisdiction. In the past there was a clear hierarchy in international law according to
which the Territoriality Principle dominated the both Nationality Principle and the Eﬀects Principle;
see the ALI (1987) Restatement. But the recent ALI (2018) Restatement unequivocally states that
there is no hierarchy among the bases in international law, even if some bases are more controversial
than others.
In what follows we will focus on three jurisdictional bases that seem most relevant to SEPs:
territoriality, active nationality ("nationality" for short below), and eﬀects. With three jurisdictional
bases that can be applied to three targets for regulation–acts, actors, and objects–there are in
principle nine possible sources of jurisdiction. But not all of them seem relevant to SEPs, however,
as we will argue below.
A possible solution in case of conflicting jurisdiction is comity, that is, that countries that would
have jurisdiction defer other countries to exercise jurisdiction, if the latter have larger legitimate
interests at stake.13 There is no requirement in customary international law for states to do so.
But countries nevertheless occasionally do this unilaterally through domestic laws and regulations
that constrain the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. There are also some international comity
12ALI (2018) points to two additional bases: the protective principle, which is concerned with national security,
and universal jurisdiction, which concerns interventions in the case of crimes against humanity etc. These are omitted
since they seem irrelevant to the issues at stake in this paper.
13See Drahozal (2012) for a discussion of economic aspects of comity.
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agreements, the most well-known is probably the 1998 EU-US positive comity agreement, under
which each side may request the other side to remedy anti-competitive behavior which originates
in the other side’s jurisdiction but aﬀects the requesting party.
3 The model
In what follows we will employ the simplest possible economic framework to capture some basic
consequences of the Default Rules. A product is imported by country A from country B, where it
is produced by a monopoly firm. The product is based on a standard that draws on two essential
patents, denoted 1 and 2, with separate holders. The firm negotiates separately and simultaneously
with each SEP holder a license fee–r1 and r2,respectively–per unit sold of the final product in
market A.
The patents are essential in two respects. First, the product cannot be produced without the
use of both patents, and second, the standard has been developed based on FRAND, implying a
commitment on behalf of the patent holders not to charge too high license fees. In each country there
is a competition authority, denoted respectively CA and CB. Depending on their jurisdiction, the
authorities can seek to enforce the FRAND commitments. There are three stages in the interaction
for any given allocation of jurisdiction over the SEPs:
1. Each competition authority decides on a ceiling for each license fee for which it has jurisdiction;
2. License fees are negotiated, respecting any FRAND regulations; and
3. Production and consumption takes place.
3.1 The product market
The product market is as simple as it could be. Consumer demand D(p) in market A is given by
D(p) ≡ argmax
c
U˜(c)− pc
where U˜(c) is gross consumer welfare, p is the good price, and c is the level of consumption. For
given license fees, the single producer maximizes its profit in standard fashion, choosing the price
P (r) ≡ argmax
p
(p− r1 − r2)D(p),
where r denotes the vector (r1, r2). By the second-order condition (SOC), the optimal price increases
in the each of the license fees, and it is assumed to increase less than proportionally in each of the
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fees:14
0 < Pi(r) < 1;
with sub- or superscript i denoting i = 1, 2, i = j. The maximized profit is
Π(r) ≡ [P (r)− r1 − r2]D(P (r)),
and the resulting maximized consumer welfare is
U(r) ≡ U˜(D(P (r)))− P (r)D(P (r)).
Both obviously fall in the level of the license fees:
Πi = −D < 0 and Ui = −DPi
3.2 License fee negotiations absent regulation
The monopoly firm negotiates the license terms simultaneously with the two SEP holders, legally
constrained by a FRAND commitment. The outcome of the bargaining is assumed to be a "Nash-in-
Nash" equilibrium, as in Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,b). Hence, each negotiation is thus pursued with
correct expectations concerning the fee to be agreed upon in the other, simultaneous negotiation.
Assuming zero reservation utilities for all parties since both patents are standard-essential, the
negotiation between the monopolist and the SEP holders yield a pair of fees that solve
max
r1
Π(r)L1(r)
max
r2
Π(r)L2(r)
where Li(r) ≡ riD(P (ri, rj)) is the license revenue for patent i. The associated first-order conditions
(FOCs) for an interior solution to the negotiation over fee ri is15
Πi(r)L
i(r) +Π(r)Lii(r) = 0
14We assume throughout the paper that SOCs are fulfilled for any optimization problems we consider. But in the
linear version of the model, reported in the Appendix, we verify whether such conditions are fullfilled or not. In the
linear model 0 < Pi < 1.
15The SOC is
ΠiiLi + 2ΠiLii +ΠLiii < 0
It is fulfilled for all feasible ri in the linear version of the model.
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This expression defines a function N i(rj) that gives the negotiated fee ri for any given rj , if the
outcome of the negotiation is not constrained by enforcement of FRAND commitments:
N i(rj) ≡ argmax
ri
Π(r)Li(r)
We assume that the fee ri that is negotiated between SEP holder i and the firm is higher fee, the
lower is the fee rj for the other SEP:
N ij < 0 (1)
This is natural assumption since a smaller rj will give more surplus to be divided between the
producer and SEP i holder, and part of this additional surplus will accrue to the holder of SEP i in
the form of a higher ri.We further assume that there is a unique equilibrium r0 ≡ (r01, r02), given by
r01 = N
1(r02) (2)
r02 = N
2(r01)
for the unconstrained negotiations. Due to the symmetry of the setting, we focus on symmetric
outcomes, r01 = r
0
2 ≡ r0. We also make the standard type of assumption that the interaction between
the two bargaining processes is "stable" in the sense that the relative slope of the two functions in
(2) is such that at (r0, r0),
dr2
dr1

N1
<
dr2
dr1

N2
< 0,
that is, that
N j(N i(rj)) > (<)rj for rj < (>)r0. (3)
This property always holds in the linear version of the model considered in the Appendix.
3.3 Enforcement of FRAND commitments
The two conditions in (2) specify the outcome r0 ≡ (r0, r0) for the case where the negotiations
are unconstrained by regulatory interventions. We now turn to first stage, in which competition
authorities can lay down their regulation of the FRAND commitments.
3.3.1 Competition authorities
The country A competition authority is concerned with consumer welfare, and the revenue of any
SEP holder(s) that are country nationals. The objective of CA is
V A(r) ≡ U(r) + α[δ1L1(r) + δ2L2(r)] (4)
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The first term captures standard consumer surplus. The parameters δi in the second term index
the nationalities of the two SEP holders, with δi = 1 (δi = 0) denoting that holder i is a national of
country A (B). The term in brackets is thus the revenue of the license holder(s) that is (are) country
A nationals, if any, and the parameter α > 0 is the relative weight that CA puts on the license
revenue. The function V A(r) captures in the simplest possible fashion the conflicting objectives of
a competition authority with regard to the license fees for SEPs. The fees are undesirable from a
consumer perspective, since they drive up the consumer price. But the competition authority is not
immune to the basic idea behind the patent system, which is to create incentives for innovations by
allowing successful innovators certain monopoly power. The second term in (4) is hence a short-
hand for a more elaborate model with endogenous innovation.16 Alternatively, it could represent
the notion the competition authority is not entirely immune to lobbying pressure from domestic
SEP holders.
There is no consumption in country B. But country B is still aﬀected by the negotiated fees.
First, one or both of the SEP holders might be nationals of country B, so the competition authority
in country B might be concerned with their revenue. Second, the producer is a national of country
B, and production occurs in country B, so the authority might be concerned with the profit of
the producer.17 The producer might be important to country B as an employer, as a generator of
incomes for share-holders, and/or as a source of tax revenue. The objective of CB is to maximize
V B(r) ≡ α[(1− δ1)L1(r) + (1− δ2)L2(r)] + γΠ(r) (5)
where α > 0 and γ ≥ 0.
It might appear odd that the weight α appears in both objective functions. This will not
constrain decisions by the two authorities to be the same with regard to the FRAND regulations,
since both authorities will trade oﬀ license revenues for their respective SEP holder(s), if any,
against another objective. CA is also concerned with consumer welfare, and CB with the profits
of its producer. Hence, for the decisions on the FRAND regulations, it is only the relative weights
on the diﬀerent components of the objective function that matter. The assumption regarding the
absolute weight on the license component does matter however, when evaluating the eﬃciency of
the various outcomes with joint welfare, that is, with the sum of the welfare of the two competition
authorities:
W (r) ≡ V A(r) + V B(r) (6)
≡ U(r) + α[L1(r) + L2(r)] + γΠ(r) (7)
Hence, the implication is that revenue is equally valuable from a global point of view regardless
16See Spulber (2019) for an analysis of SEPs with endogenously determined research and development.
17For CB to be aﬀected by the enforcement of the FRAND commitments, we exclude the situation where both
δ1 = δ2 = 1 and γ = 0.
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of whether it it accrues to one or the other of the SEP holders. An alternative presentation of
the model would be to start with the global welfare function on the second line above, and then
delegate the objective of maximizing W (r) regionally, by letting CA maximize U(r) + αL1(r), and
CB αL2(r) + γΠ(r).
Let the pair of license fees that maximize W (r) be denoted rJ , with rJ1 = r
J
2 ≡ rJ due to
symmetry. Each of these fees rJi balances the positive eﬀect on the revenue for the holder of SEP
i, and the adverse eﬀects of the fees on consumer surplus, on holder of SEP j, and possibly also on
the profit of the producer (depending on whether γ ≥ 0):
Wi = Ui + αLii + αL
j
i + γΠi
= (α− Pi − γ)D + α(ri + rj)DpPi,
where the terms Ui, αLji and γΠi are all negative, and where αLii is positive for small ri.
It will be assumed that the marginal impact of each license fee is more negative, the larger is
the other fee:
W12 < 0 (8)
This assumption is stronger than necessary for what follows, but is assumed for simplicity and since
it seems reasonable. It is fulfilled for all relevant α in the linear version of the model.
Importantly for what follows, we will focus on situations where the unconstrained jointly eﬃcient
regulation restricts the negotiated outcome, but still allows for strictly positive fees for the SEPs;
that is, we assume throughout that (0, 0) < rJ < r0.18 This is a natural assumption since it only
excludes cases where the jointly eﬃcient outcome is to deny the SEP holders any revenue (rJ = 0),
and to leave the market unregulated (rJ ≥ r0). The jointly optimal license fees are hence given
by19
V Ai (r
J) + V Bi (r
J) = 0. (9)
3.3.2 The impact of regulation on negotiated license fees
Interventions by the competition authorities are constrained in two respects: First, authorities can
only intervene with regard to patents for which they have jurisdiction. Second, being competition
authorities rather than more general regulatory agencies, the authorities can only intervene to limit
the patent holders’ exploitation of market power in the form of high fees for the patents, that is,
they can only impose upper limits on permitted license fees. The competition authorities cannot
implement higher fees than what is negotiated between the producer and the respective patent
holder, should they so prefer.
In case both authorities impose restrictions on a particular license fee, the SEP holder is as-
18Here and in what follows we let vector notation r < r denote ri < ri, i = 1, 2, etc..
19A necessary condition for rJi > 0 is that α− γ > Pi, where 0 < Pi < 1.
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sumed to comply with both determinations by respecting the more stringent of the two regulations.
Formally, let mAi and m
B
i be the maximal fees allowed by the respective competition authority for
SEP i. The maximal permitted fee for SEP i will then be mi ≡ min(mAi ,mBi ). Let m ≡ (m1,m2)
be the pair of most binding regulations.20
Four types of situations may arise as a result of the regulatory decisions. First, if both fees are
regulated to levels below what would result without regulation–that is,m < r0–both interventions
will bind: r = m. Second, in the opposite case where neither of the interventions aﬀects the
negotiated outcomes–that is, m ≥ r0–the outcome is the pair of fees resulting from unconstrained
negotiations: r = r0.
There are also asymmetric cases. One such case is where one of the constraints is lax enough not
to bind regardless of the negotiated fee for the other SEP. In this case the implemented fee for the
leniently treated SEP will be determined through an unconstrained negotiation, which is aﬀected by
the other fee. For instance, suppose m2 > N1(0) as illustrated in Figure 1. The feasible outcomes
are then r = (m1, N2(m1))–the thick line in the figure–where r1 ∈ [0, r0] is the implementable
range of r1 for CA.
Another asymmetric case arises when r0 < m2 < N2(0). There will then be a critical value
of m1 for any m2, denoted Rˆ1(m2), which is the level of m1 that would induce the unconstrained
negotiation over SEP 2 to result in the fee m2. That is, Rˆ1(m2) is given by N2(Rˆ1(m2)) ≡ m2, and
Rˆi(rj) is more generally given by
N j(Rˆi(rj)) ≡ rj . (10)
As illustrated in Figure 2, for m1 ≤ Rˆ1(m2), the implemented fee r1 would be suﬃciently low that
the regulation r2 ≤ m2 restricts the outcome of the negotiation over r2. In this case the implemented
outcome will be r = (m1,m2); this is the horizontal part of the thick line in the figure.
Finally, for Rˆ1(m2) < m1 < r01 the outcome of an unconstrained negotiation regarding r2 would
be a lower fee than m2, in which case the regulation r2 ≤ m2 would not bind. The outcome in this
case is r = (m1, N2(m1)).
The outcome of the regulations can hence be summarized as follows:
Lemma 1 The negotiated fees r depend on the regulations m as follows:
r(m) ≡
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
m if m < r0
(mi,min(mj , N
j(mi)) if mi < r0i and mj > r
0
j
r0 if m > r0
(11)
20 If there is no intervention by competition authority a with regard to patent i we can set mai ≥ N i(0), a = A,B,
since this is formally equivalent to a non-binding regulation.
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Figure 1: Implementable license fees with r0 < N2(0) < m2
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Figure 2: Implementable license fees with r0 < m2 < N2(0)
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3.4 Allocating jurisdiction over the SEPs according to the Default Rules
In what follows we will derive the outcome of the regulation by the competition authority or au-
thorities, as the case may be, for each of the three bases for jurisdiction in the Default Rules that
are of main relevance to SEPs: territoriality, nationality, and cross-border eﬀects. And for each
base we consider whether it is applicable to the acts, actors and objects involved.
Consider first the Territoriality Principle. The acts at issue in this context would be the behavior
of SEP holders in the negotiations. We have not specified where the negotiation take place, however,
partly since we want to leave open the nationality of the SEP holders. The actors involved are the
SEP holders, but it is hard to see how the Territoriality Principle could be applied to these actors
beyond the location of the acts that they commit. The objects at issue, the SEPs, have clear
territorial features however, since the patents apply to the territory of country A, and only to
this territory. We thus presume that an application of the Territoriality Principle gives country A
jurisdiction over both SEPs.
Turning to the Nationality Principle, note first that acts do not seem to have nationality in
any meaningful way, at least not here. But the actors obviously have nationality. The Nationality
Principle would give jurisdiction to the home country of the respective SEP holder. We will allow
for three diﬀerent patterns of ownership of the SEPs: one where both holders are nationals of
country A, one where they are both nationals of country B, and one where the holder of SEP 1 is a
country A national and the holder of SEP 2 a national of country B. The objects, the patents, are
issued by country A. The Nationality Principle could therefore also give jurisdiction to country A.
But it seems plausible that the nationality of the actors should dominate from point of view of the
Nationality Principle; at least this is what will be assumed.
Finally, there will be inherently conflicting claims when applying the Eﬀects Principle, at least
when interpreted literally, since the license fees aﬀect both the producer and consumers. Starting
with the acts, exploitation of market power by the SEP holders will directly aﬀect the producer,
providing an argument for CB to claim jurisdiction. But the resulting higher consumer price will
harm consumers, giving CA a rationale for regulating. There will also be spill-over eﬀects between
the two bargaining processes, since a high ri reduces the scope for a high rj . If the SEPs holders have
diﬀerent nationalities, both authorities can point to eﬀects as a reason for enforcing the FRAND
commitment by the other country’s SEP holder. Finally, it does not seem meaningful to identify
either the actors or the objects–the SEPs–with eﬀects other than those that stem from acts. We
will thus interpret the Eﬀect Principle to give both countries jurisdiction over both patents.21
Table 1 summarizes the reasoning above. "A1" is a short-hand for country A having (possibly
overlapping) jurisdiction over SEP 1, etc., and "n.a." denotes constellations of jurisdictional bases
and targets for regulation that do not appear to be meaningful in the context of SEPs. Bracketed
21 It appears as if country B could at least in theory use the Passive-Nationality Principle to claim jurisdiction,
pointing to the need to protect its producer, and the holder of SEP 2 if a country B national, against the adverse
eﬀects of a high r1.
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allocations are assumed to be dominated by other allocations for the respective jurisdictional base.
As can be seen, it is a fairly complex pattern that emerges:
Regulated entities
Jurisdictional base Acts Actors Objects
Territoriality Principle Location not specified n.a. A1,A2
Nationality Principle, split ownership n.a. A1,B2 [A1,A2]
Nationality Principle, both holders A nat’ls n.a. A1,A2 [A1,A2]
Nationality Principle, both holders B nat’ls n.a. B1,B2 [A1,A2]
Eﬀects Principle A1,A2,B1,B2 n.a. n.a.
Table 1: Allocation of jurisdiction as suggested by the Default Rules
Put diﬀerently:
Observation 1 The Default Rules points to, but does not unambiguously specify, the following
allocation of jurisdiction:
(i) The Territoriality Principle gives CA exclusive jurisdiction over both SEPs;
(ii) The Nationality Principle gives each authority jurisdiction over its national SEPs holder(s);
and
(iii) The Eﬀects Principle gives both countries jurisdiction over both SEPs.
Note that the pattern of ownership of the SEPs has two qualitatively diﬀerent implications
for the outcome. First, as we have just seen, it aﬀects the allocation of jurisdiction that stems
from applying the Nationality Principle (and possibly also the Eﬀects Principle). Second, for each
allocation of jurisdiction, it aﬀects the objective function(s) of the regulating authority(-ies), and
thereby the regulatory decisions that will be made.
4 The outcomes with the three main bases for jurisdiction
We are now prepared to address our main issue: the relative virtues of the diﬀerent jurisdictional
bases in the Default Rules. This section focuses on the case where the ownership of the SEPs is
divided between the countries, with the holder of SEP 1 being a national of country A, and the SEP
2 holder being a country B national. In this setting CA is concerned with consumer welfare and
the revenue of SEP holder 1, and CB focuses on the revenue of holder 2, and possibly also industry
17
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profits (γ ≥ 0). The objective functions of the competition authorities are thus:
V A(r) ≡ U(r) + αL1(r)
V B(r) ≡ αL2(r) + γΠ(r)
4.1 The Territoriality Principle
Applying the Territoriality Principle to the SEPs suggests, as argued above, that CA should have
exclusive jurisdiction over both SEPs. The problem facing CA is thus to solve
max
m1,m2
V A(r(m))
with r(m) defined in (11).
CA’s preferences with respect to r2 is straightforward: the higher is r2, the higher is the price
of the product, and the lower thus the consumer surplus and the revenue of patent holder 1:
V A2 = U2 + αL12 (12)
= −DP2 + αr1DpP2 < 0,
where U2 < 0, and LA2 < 0. Hence, CA prefers r2 to be as low as possible. Since CA can implement
r2 = 0 without reducing its choice set with regard to r1, it will do so by setting m2 = 0.
CA’s preferences with regard to the implemented fee r1 are more ambiguous, and partly depend
on the magnitude of the parameter α. As with r2, the higher is r1, the lower is the consumer surplus.
But CA is also concerned with the revenue of the holder of SEP 1, which requires a strictly positive
r1:
V A1 = −DP1 + α(D + r1DpP1) ≷ 0. (13)
The optimal regulation for SEP will in general depend on the weight on license revenues relative
to consumer welfare in CA’s preferences. For α suﬃciently small consumer welfare interests will
completely dominate, V A1 (0, 0) = U1+αL11 < 0, and it will be optimal for CA to choose a maximally
strict regulation of FRAND1: r1 = m1 = 0. CA will prefer 0 < r1 < N1(0) for α > α, given by
V A1 (0, 0;α) ≡ [α − P1(0, 0)]D (14)
= 0
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for CA to prefer a strictly positive r1 is thus that α > P1(0, 0).
The optimal r1 > 0 is then given by V A1 (r1, 0) = 0. With α increasing beyond α it will eventually
hit a value α such that
V A1 (N
1(0), 0;α) ≡ 0 (15)
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This is the highest m1 that CA can enforce. For any higher m1 the implemented outcome will be
N1(0). There will consequently be no point to intervene regarding FRAND1 for CA when α > α.
For the assumption rJ > 0 to be fulfilled, it must hold that V A1 (r
J) > 0, since V B1 (r
J) < 0. This
would be compatible with CA choosing the regulation m = 0 if V A12 is suﬃciently positive. But such
a setting seems less interesting, and we thus disregard this possibility. For instance, it cannot arise
in the linear version of the model.
It is possible however to have an equilibrium where CA chooses a regulation m1 < r
0, with m1
given by
V A1 (m1, 0) = 0. (16)
This solution requires m1 > rJ . This follows from the fact that for given r2, CA’s optimal r1 must
be larger than what is jointly eﬃcient, since CA disregards the adverse eﬀect of r1 on the other
country. Hence, it must be the case that CA’s optimal response to r2 = 0, m given by (16), must
exceed the jointly eﬃcient r1 given r2 = 0. The latter value of r1 must in turn exceed rJ1 by virtue
of (8), since it implies that the two FOCs with regard to joint welfare maximization are negatively
sloped in the (r1, r2) plane. It follows that CA will either choose a regulation rJ < m1 ≤ r0 as an
interior solution, or if CA prefers r1 > r,0, CA abstains from regulating the FRAND commitment
for SEP 1. In the latter case r1 = N1(0).
Hence:
Lemma 2 When SEP holder 1 is a country A national, and holder 2 is a national of country B,
the possible outcomes are:
(i) r = (m1, 0) with m1 given by (16) for α < α < α, with α in turn given by (14) and α by
(15); and
(iii) r = (N1(0), 0) for α > α.
To see the nature of the ineﬃciency of this allocation of jurisdiction, evaluate the derivatives of
the joint welfare function at the solution to (16) :
W1(m1, 0) = V
B
1 < 0
W2(m1, 0) = V
B
2 (m1, 0)
= (α− γ)D > 0
where the sign of the second inequality follows from m2 = 0 and the assumption that rJ2 > 0 (which
requires α > γ). Consequently:
Proposition 1 When the holder of SEP 1 is national of country A and the holder of SEP 2 is
a national of country B, the Territoriality Principle yields too lenient enforcement of the FRAND
commitment for SEP 1, and too stringent enforcement of that for SEP 2.
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4.2 The Nationality Principle
The natural implication of the Nationality Principle is that CA has exclusive jurisdiction over the
FRAND commitment for SEP 1, and CB exclusive jurisdiction of that for SEP 2, as argued above.
This setting is qualitatively diﬀerent from the one where CA or CB has jurisdiction over both SEPs,
since there will now be an interaction between the nationally pursued regulations in certain situations.
This stems from the assumption that the competition authorities determine their regulations m1
and m2 before the negotiations over the fees take place. Consequently, each authority will be aware
of the fact that the outcome of the regulation will be given r(m). This implies that a regulation
r1 ≤ m1 by CA will not only aﬀect r1, but can in certain instances also aﬀect r2.
The Nash equilibrium regulations is now be given by
max
m1
V A(r(m))
max
m2
V B(r(m));
There are several types of Nash equilibria, depending on the preference functions of the competition
authorities. We consider first symmetric, and then asymmetric, outcomes.
(i) mi = 0. One potential outcome is that both authorities set their respective fee to its minimum
level, mA1 = m
B
2 = 0, so r = (0, 0). This equilibrium would require that α is suﬃciently small that
V A1 (0, 0) < 0 and V
B
2 (0, 0) < 0. But this outcome is not compatible with the assumption that the
jointly optimal outcome is strictly positive, rJ > 0.
(ii) 0 < mi < r0. A second possibility is that the competition authorities prefer positive license fees
for their respective SEPs, but not higher fees than that both can be implemented: the equilibrium
regulations would then be 0 < m1 < r0 and 0 < m2 < r0. Given that m2 < r0, it is not possible for
CA to aﬀect r2 through its choice of m1, and conversely for CB. Hence, for 0 < m < r0 to be an
equilibrium it is necessary and suﬃcient that
V A1 (r(m)) = U1 + αL11 (17)
= 0
and
V B2 (r(m)) = αL22 + γΠ2 (18)
= 0.
This outcome requires that α is large enough to make both authorities prefer strictly positive fees,
but low enough that the implementation constraints are not violated.22
22Necessary but not suﬃcient is that α > max(P1, γ). Suﬃcient would be e.g. that α > 1 and CB is only concerned
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(iii) mi = r0. A third possibility is that α is suﬃciently large that neither competition authority
can achieve its desirable fee due to the implementation constraint, and therefore abstains from
regulating (or equivalently, sets mi = r0). This equilibrium arises when
V A1 (r
0) > 0
V B2 (r
0) > 0
in which case the outcome is r = r0.
(iv) mi < r0 < mj. In the cases above neither FRAND regulation imposes a binding constraint on
the negotiated fee that exceeds the unregulated level r0. But there are also outcomes that implement
ri < r
0 < rj . These outcomes can have a special property. To illustrate, assume that γ is small, so
that CB is only concerned with the revenue of SEP holder 2. In this case CB prefers m2 > N2(0),
but CB cannot implement its desired r2 for any level of m1, since its preferred m2 will exceed what
the parties will negotiate, N2(m1). This case is illustrated in Figure 1, where the two solid lines are
the two bargaining outcomes N1(r2) and N2(r1), and where it is assumed that m2 > N2(0). The
outcome for any m1 ≤ r0 will thus be (m1, N2(m1)) by (11). Consequently, when choosing the level
of m1, CA will not only take into account how the choice of m1 aﬀects r1, CA will also take into
account how m1 aﬀects the fee r2. The higher is m1, the lower will the negotiated r2 be. Increasing
m1 will thus be attractive in that it will leave more surplus to be divided between the parties in the
negotiation concerning SEP 1. CA will thus in terms of Figure 1 choose the point along the thick
portion of the curve N2(r1) that maximizes its welfare.
Observation 2 When each competition authority regulates the FRAND commitment for a domestic
SEP only, an authority can in certain cases use a lenient enforcement of its domestic FRAND
commitment as a means of inducing a low negotiated fee for the foreign SEP.23
In the linear version of the model, this incentive is suﬃciently strong that CA prefers to push down
r2 as far as is possible, resulting in m = r0. As a consequence, the Nationality Principle does not
aﬀect the outcome in the linear version of the model.
The feature just described may, but need not, aﬀect the equilibrium. It will definitely do so
whenever it is optimal for CB to set m2 > N
2(0), as was assumed above. In such a case, for m2 to
be optimal for CB, CB should not want to deviate, for given m1, to some r2 smaller than N2(m1)):
m2 : V B(m1,m2) ≥ V B(m1, N2(m1))0 (19)
with icense revenue (γ = 0).
23This feature stems from the assumption the decisions by the two competition authorities are made prior to the
negotiations over fees.
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For m1 to be optimal for CA it is required that
dV A(m1, N
2(m1))
dm1
= V A1 + V
A
2 N
2
1 (20)
= 0
It follows from V A2 N
2
1 > 0 that V
A
1 < 0 in this equilibrium, so CA is then choosing a implement a
higher m1 than what would be optimal from the point of view of its implication for r1, to reduce
r2.
The fact that m1 aﬀects r2 for m1 ≥ Rˆ1(m2) but not for lower values yields a non-concavity in
the objective function of CA at m1 = Rˆ1(m2). As a consequence, there are two possible types of
equilibria with r0 < m2 < N2(0), depending on whether m1 ≷ Rˆ1(m2) (as defined in (10)). One
possibility is that the equilibrium is of the same type as in (20), that is, along the downward-sloping
portion of the thick line in Figure 2. In this case the resulting fees will be r = (m1, N2(m1)) by
(11). The other possibility is that the equilibrium is along the horizontal portion of the thick line.
In this case there is an interior optimum r = (m1,m2) given by (17) and (18). The preferences of
CA and CB will aﬀect whether the equilibrium will be of the first or second type. For instance,
for given m2, CA might prefer to set m1 such that it implements CA’s preferred r1 as closely as
possible. Alternatively, CA might be willing to accept a less well-targeted r1 in order to push down
r2.
Lemma 3 When SEP holder 1 is a national of country A, and holder 2 is a national of country
B, the possible implemented outcomes with the Nationality Principle are:
(i) r < r0 with m being the solutions to (17) and (18);
(ii) r0 < r1 < Rˆ1(r2) and r0 < r2 < N2(m1), with (r1, r2) being given by respectively (17) and (18)
(or with the roles of the two SEPs reversed);
(iii) r = (r1, N2(r1)), with r1 given by (20) (or with the roles of the two SEPs reversed).
Turning to eﬃciency properties, in the case where m is determined by (17) and (18),
W1(r(m)) = V
B
1 (r(m)) < 0
W2(r(m)) = V
A
2 (r(m)) < 0
It follows from Wi(rJ) = 0 that r(m) > r
J .
Finally, the case where r = (m1, N2(m1)) requires that m2 > r0 > rJ , so m2 will clearly be
too high from a joint welfare perspective. m1 will also impose a too lenient restriction from a joint
welfare perspective, since when setting m1, CA does not take into consideration the negative impact
on the welfare of CB:
V A1 (r(m)) <
d
dm1
V A(r(m)) = 0
22
Henrik Horn
It follows from
V A1 (r
J) = −V B1 (rJ) > 0
and the concavity of V A, that m1 > rJ ,with m1 given by (20).
Proposition 2 The Nationality Principle yields too lax enforcement of both FRAND commitments
when the SEP holders have diﬀerent nationalities.
4.3 The Eﬀects Principle
A third base for jurisdiction is the Eﬀects Principle. It is straightforward to see the implications it
will have in our setting, As we saw above, CA prefers the license fee for the foreign-owned SEP 2 to
be as low as possible, to maximize consumer surplus and the revenue of SEP holder 1. CB wants
r1 to be as small as possible to maximize the profit of the producer, as well as the revenue of the
holder of patent 2. Consequently, since the more stringent of the regulations bind when they are
overlapping, the implemented outcome is
r = (mB1 ,m
A
2 ) = (0, 0)
There will thus be too stringent enforcement, since rJ > 0.
Proposition 3 The Eﬀects Principle yields too strict enforcement of both FRAND commitments.
4.4 Other ownership patterns for the SEPs
We have thus far assumed that the holders of the SEPs have diﬀerent nationalities. This is both
from a theory and a practical point of view the more interesting case. But some understanding of
the forces at work in this can be had from considering two alternative structures, one where both
SEPs are held by nationals of the country issuing the patents, and one where they are nationals of
the other country.
4.4.1 SEPs holders are nationals of the country issuing the patents
When both SEPs are country A nationals, CA is concerned with consumer welfare as well as the
revenue of the two SEP holders, while CB’s only interest is the profit of its exporter to country A.
The objective functions of the competition authorities are then
V A(r) ≡ U(r) + α[L1(r) + L2(r)]
V B(r) ≡ γΠ(r).
In this case both the Territoriality and the Nationality Principle plausibly allocates jurisdiction over
both SEPs to country A. To highlight the incentives for CA to regulate the FRAND commitments,
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consider the impact of an exogenous increase in ri on CA welfare:
V Ai = −DPi + α[D + r1DpPi + r2DpPi] ≷ 0 (21)
Hence, an increase in ri drives up the product price and thereby reduces consumer welfare, Ui < 0.
The resulting lower demand tends to reduce the license revenue for both SEPs. But it also tends
to increase the revenue for SEP i. Indeed, if r1 = r2 = 0 at the outset, a small increase in ri will
increase aggregate license revenue. The same considerations apply symmetrically to the other SEP,
so CA will prefer r1 = r2 = rˆ given by
V Ai (rˆ) = 0 (22)
where rˆ ≡ (rˆ, rˆ). CA will thus choose the regulation m = rˆ, provided that m ≤ r0, so that rˆ can
be implemented. The assumption that the jointly eﬃcient fee rJ is interior (0 < rJ < r0), and thus
given by
V Ai (r
J) +Πi(r
J) = 0,
implies that
V Ai (r
J) > 0
That is, the optimal regulation for CA is rJ <m = rˆ ≤ r0.
Turning to the Eﬀects Principle, since the country B exporter is adversely aﬀected by the license
fees of both country A SEPs, CB will set the lowest possible fees, implying that it will enforce
r = (0, 0). The outcome of the Eﬀects Principle will thus be the same as when the ownership of
the SEP is shared between the countries, resulting in too stringent regulation of both FRAND
commitments.
The above findings can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4 When both SEPs holders are nationals of country A both the Territoriality and the
Nationality Principle yields too lenient enforcement of both FRAND commitments, while the Eﬀects
Principle results in too stringent regulation.
4.4.2 SEPs holders are not nationals of the country issuing the patents
When both SEP holders are country B nationals, the CA and CB welfare functions are:
V A(r) ≡ U(r)
V B(r) ≡ α[L1(r) + L2(r)] + γΠ(r)
The Territoriality Principle still suggests that CA should regulate. But in contrast to the previous
case, CA will now only protect domestic consumer surplus. It will consequently impose the strictest
possible FRAND terms on both SEP negotiations, that is, it will set m = (0, 0).
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The Nationality Principle instead allocates jurisdiction over both SEPs to CB. It will now be CB
that internalizes the interconnectedness of the two bargaining processes, and for this reason tends
to impose relatively lenient restrictions. But CB but will also take the impact on the producer into
account (assuming γ > 0):
V Bi = α(D + r1DpPi + r2DpPi)− γD
For α suﬃciently small the producer welfare interest will completely dominate, and it will be optimal
for CB to impose a maximally strict regulation of FRAND1; m1 = m2 = 0. But the assumption
that rJ > 0 implies that
Ui(r
J) + V Bi (r
J) = 0,
and thus, since Ui < 0, that
V Bi (r
J) > 0
That is, CB will choose a more lenient regulation than is jointly optimal, rJ < m ≤ r0, since it
disregards the adverse consequences for country A consumers from high fees.
Finally, if jurisdiction is based on the Eﬀects Principle, the outcome would be the same as
for the other two ownership patterns, r = (0, 0), yielding too strict enforcement of both FRAND
commitments.
Proposition 5 When neither SEPs holder is a national of the country issuing the patents:
(i) The Territoriality and the Eﬀects Principle yield too stringent enforcement of the FRAND
commitments for both SEPs; and
(ii) The Nationality Principle leads to too lenient regulation of the FRAND commitments for both
SEPs.
4.5 The relative performance of the three bases for jurisdiction
The previous sections have considered a the outcome for diﬀerent bases for jurisdiction, in several
economic settings. The purpose of the analysis was to determine whether any of the jurisdictional
bases could be said to yield a persistently better outcome. The findings above might appear some-
what bewildering in this regard, simple as the economic model is. But a couple of more general
conclusions can be extracted:
Corollary 1 (i) When there is no overlap in jurisdiction, regulating countries will impose too
lenient enforcement of its own SEPs, and too stringent regulation of the other country’ SEP(s).
(ii) Whenever jurisdiction is overlapping, there will be too stringent enforcement.
Consequently, neither of the three basic bases for jurisdiction will implement the jointly eﬃcient
outcome. Intuitively, in order for the enforcement of FRAND commitments to be jointly eﬃcient,
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two conditions must normally be fulfilled: (i) the objective function to be maximized must reflect
the interests of both CA and CB, and (ii) the full set of fees are under the command of this policy
maker. When the ownership of the SEPs is split between the countries, the Territoriality Principle
implies that requirement (ii) is fulfilled, since it allows country A to set both restrictions on the
fees. But it has the drawback of only leading to the maximization of V A. The Nationality Principle
instead allows both objective functions to be maximized, thus fulfilling requirement (i), but it has
the disadvantage of causing each of the maximizations be done with respect to one of the fees only.
The specifics of the situation will determine which principle performs better.
The two basic principles can be ranked however in two extreme cases. First, if α is large enough
that competition authorities eﬀectively only care about the license revenues of their respective SEP
holder, the interests of the authorities would directly conflict, since a higher license fee for one SEP
reduces the negotiated fee for the other. Letting one authority decide on both fees, as should be
the allocation of jurisdiction according to the Territoriality Principle, will then be very harmful to
the interests of the other authority. On the other hand, when α is quite small, the two authorities’
interests tend to become more aligned, since the prime objective for CA–consumer surplus–and
the prime objective for CB–producer profit–both benefit from low fees. Hence, letting CA regulate
both fees will then be less of a problem from CB’s point of view. This relation can be seen in the
linear version of the model, where the Territoriality Principle is more jointly eﬃcient for lower values
of α (despite the assumption γ = 0), and where the Nationality Principle dominates for larger values
(although implementing the non-regulated outcome r0).
Formally, when both parties eﬀectively maximize their own the revenues of their domestically-
owned SEP, the Territoriality Principle (TP) yields the outcome
rTPi = argmaxri
L1(r1, r2)
while the Nationality Principle results in
rNPi = argmaxri
Li(r1, r2)
The latter will be better from a joint welfare point of view if:
W TP = L1(rTP1 , 0) + L
2(rTP1 , 0) < L
1(rNP1 , r
NP
2 ) + L
2(rNP1 , r
NP
2 ) =W
NP
This hence holds in the linear version of the model for suﬃciently large α.
The failure of the three bases to achieve a jointly eﬃcient outcome raises the question of whether
they are actually harmful. Assuming that both competition authorities regulate both FRAND
commitments absent the Default Rules, the answer is simple with regard to the Eﬀects Principle,
since it will yield the same result as when the Default Rules are not applied. More unclear is whether
the other bases improves matters. But in the linear version of the model both the Territoriality
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and Nationality Principles yield jointly more eﬃcient outcomes than when both countries regulate
both FRAND commitments, as with the Eﬀects Principle. However, for larger α it will be more
eﬃcient if both competition authorities refrain from regulating any commitment than if they allocate
jurisdiction according to the Territoriality Principle, and refraining from regulating would for any
α yield the same joint welfare level as applying the Nationality Principle.
5 National Treatment
The jointly eﬃcient outcome requires that the license fees are identical, due to the completely sym-
metric way in which they aﬀect the producer, and joint welfare. But some of the ineﬃcient outcomes
that we established above involved more stringent enforcement of foreign-owned than domestically-
owned SEPs. It appears as if this could potentially violate a National Treatment obligation in a
trade agreement. For instance, the first part of the National Treatment provision in Art. 3 of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) reads:
1. Each Members shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less fa-
vorably than that it accords it own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual
property, subject to the exceptions already provided in [various conventions].
Without pretending to have undertaken a legal analysis of the applicability of this provision to
SEPs, we note that more stringent treatment of a foreign-owned than a domestically-owned SEP
could prima facie be taken to amount to "less favorable treatment" of the foreign-owned intellectual
property right. But regardless of the applicability of this particular National Treatment provision,
it is of interest to examine whether a constraint on diﬀerential treatment of domestic and foreign
SEPs could improve on the outcome, alone or in combination with one of the bases in the Default
Rules. We will examine this in two settings, one where a "National Treatment" obligation applies to
SEP regulations within an industry, and a second more far-reaching interpretation where it applies
across industries.
5.1 National Treatment within an industry
For a National Treatment obligation to have a bite, it must simultaneously be case that the SEP
holders have diﬀerent nationalities, that the same competition authority regulates both SEPs, and
that this authority treats the foreign-owned patent less favorably that the patent with a domestic
holder. This situation cannot arise under the Nationality Principle in the one-industry setting above,
since jurisdiction is then split between the two countries. But it can arise either if jurisdiction is
awarded according to the Territoriality Principle to CA, according to the Eﬀects Principle, or when
no jurisdictional rule is followed–in each case provided that the ownership of the SEPs is divided
between the countries. Assume therefore that the holder of SEP 1 is a country A national, and the
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other holder a national of country B. A natural interpretation of a National Treatment restriction
would then be a requirement for CA to set m1 = m2.24
Consider first the case where the National Treatment provision is imposed in a situation where no
jurisdictional principles are applied, and where therefore both competition authorities regulate both
FRAND commitments (or alternatively where they do so by virtue of the Eﬀects Principle). Each
of the competition authorities will impose the most stringent possible regulation on the respective
other country’s SEP, resulting in the outcome r = (0, 0). Their regulations will be discriminatory,
so a strict National Treatment provision that requests each authority to impose the same regulation
on both SEPs will aﬀect the outcome.25 The resulting outcome will be the lower of the common
levels mA and mB chosen by the respective competition authority, provided that it is low enough
to be implementable.
For instance, suppose that CA sets the more stringent regulation; the mechanism will be the
same if it is instead CB that sets the more stringent regulation. CA’s optimal regulation will be
given by mA ≡ (mA,mA), with
V A1 (m
A) + V A2 (m
A) = U1 + U2 + α(L11 + L12)
= 0,
provided mA is implementable (and disregarding corner solutions). mA will thus be higher, the
higher is α. Using this expression to evaluate the FOC for the jointly optimal fees (9) at mA we
get:
Wi(m
A) = V Ai (m
A) + V Bi (m
A)
= −V Aj (mA) + V Bi (mA)
= (Pj − γ)D
Hence, a strict National Treatment provision could implement the jointly eﬃcient regulation by
a pure coincidence–if Pj = γ. If instead Pi > γ, it follows from Wi(mA) > 0 that rJ > mA.
There will thus then be too stringent enforcement with the National Treatment provision, so the
fully eﬃcient outcome is not implemented. But the imposition of a National Treatment obligation
will still unambiguously improve joint welfare, since it will then hold that (0, 0) < mA < rJ . The
imposition of the strict National Treatment provision can also increase welfare if Pj < γ so that it
implements mA > rJ . But there does not seem to be any guarantee that this will be the case, as
long as the unregulated outcome r0 can yield less joint welfare than r = (0, 0), the outcome when
24Since we are assuming that CA sets a more stringent restriction on the license fee for the foreign SEP absent a
National Treatment obligation, we disregard that National Treatment provisions normally are in the form of weak
inequalities, such as "treatment no less favorable than...".
25A natural interpretation of a National Treatment restriction would then be a requirement for CA not to impose
a regulation with m1 ≥ m2.
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both competition authorities regulate.
Assume next that the National Treatment obligation is imposed in a situation where jurisdiction
is allocated to CA according to the Territoriality Provision. Absent the obligation, CA would choose
m1 < r
0 and m2 = 0 such that
V A1 (m

1, 0) = 0
V A2 (m

1, 0) ≤ 0.
and the diﬀerence in the regulated levels would thus be m1−m2 = m1.To see the eﬀect of a National
Treatment provision, consider the imposition of a provision that only requests CA to reduce this gap
with a marginal amount. To abide by the rule, CA could either make both restrictions more lenient,
while letting m2 increase more than m1. Alternatively, CA could reduce m1, while maintaining m2
constant. A reduction change in m1 will not have any first-order eﬀect at (m1, 0) since V
A
1 (m

1, 0) =
0. But an increase in m2 will have a negative first-order eﬀect equal to (−D+αrDp)P2 < 0. Hence,
CA’s optimal adjustment to this slightly binding National Treatment rule would be to reduce
m1, while maintaining m2 constant. As the rule is gradually further tightened, it will eventually
be optimal for CA to set m2 > 0. And with a strict National Treatment rule, requesting equal
regulation of the two FRAND commitments, CA will set 0 < m1 = m2 < m1.
The imposition of a marginally binding National Treatment rule will be desirable from a joint
welfare perspective. But there is no guarantee that joint welfare increases with the imposition of
strict National Treatment, since the changes are then non-marginal. Indeed, in the linear version
of the model with CA exclusively regulating both FRAND commitments with and without the
National Treatment provision, the imposition of this obligation will reduce joint welfare for the
relevant range of α. That is, in that setting it is preferable from a joint welfare perspective to allow
CA to discriminate between the two SEPs.
To summarize:
Proposition 6 With the Territoriality Principle applied to discriminatory treatment within an
industry in which the ownership of the patents is split between the countries:
(1) The imposition of a marginally binding National Treatment provision will improve joint welfare;
and
(2) The imposition of a strict National Treatment provision has ambiguous implications for joint
welfare, if the patent-issuing country has exclusive jurisdiction over both SEPs.
5.2 National Treatment across industries
A National Treatment obligation would not have any bite with jurisdiction based on the Nationality
Principle in the economic framework we have used so far, for the simple reason that each competition
authority then regulates only one SEP. But a National Treatment obligation could have a bite also
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Figure 3: Production pattern with two industries
when jurisdiction is allocated according to the Nationality Principle, in more general economic
settings. To illustrate in the simplest possible fashion, assume that there are two industries X and
Y. Industry X is identical to the one examined above. Industry Y is a mirror image with the roles
of the countries reversed; see Figure 3 for an illustration.
In industry X production draws on two SEPs, the country A-owned X1 and the country B-owned
X2, and production in industry Y uses the country A-owned Y1 and the country B-owned Y2. With
rX ≡ (rX1, rX2) and rY ≡ (rY 1, rY 2), the objective functions for CA for the two sectors are:
V AX(rX) ≡ UX(rX) + αLX1(rX) (23)
V AY (rY ) ≡ αL1Y (rY ) + γΠY (rY ). (24)
and the corresponding expressions for CB are:
V BX(rX) ≡ αLX2(rX) + γΠX(rX) (25)
V BY (rY ) ≡ UY (rY ) + αL2Y (rY ) (26)
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Assuming that the industries are economically completely separated, the jointly eﬃcient outcome
is the solution to
max
rX1,rX2
V AX(rX) + V
BX(rX) (27)
max
rY 1,rY 2
V AY (rY ) + V
BY (rY ) (28)
if unconstrained by the implementation constraints.
With jurisdiction allocated according to the Nationality Principle, CA now regulates FRAND
commitments for SEPs X1 and Y1, and CB those for SEPs X2 and Y2. Absent a National Treatment
obligation, CA would here set mX1 identically to how country A chooses m1 in Section 4.2, and
it would set mY 1 as country B sets m2 in that section. So the regulations for each of the markets
are mX ≡ (mX1,mX2) and mY ≡ (mY 1,mY 2). With rX(mX) defined as in (11), and rY (mY ) in
symmetric fashion, country A would thus solve the problem
max
mX1,mY 1
V AX(rX(mX)) + V
AY (rY (mY )) (29)
and CB would solve a symmetric problem.
There are several possible equilibrium constellations in this case, as was summarized in Lemma
3. Consider the case where α is suﬃciently large that each competition authority thus regulates the
SEP that is used by the foreign producer less stringently than the SEP that is used by its domestic
producer for exports. For simplicity, assume that the outcome is rX1 = N1(0) and rX2 = 0, and
rY 1 = 0 and rY 2 = N2(0).
There is no diﬀerential treatment of foreign-owned and domestically-owned SEPs within either
industry. But the consequence of the FRAND enforcement is still to discriminate between domestic
and foreign interests, albeit in diﬀerent industries; rX1 > rY 1 = 0 and rY 2 > rX2 = 0. Consider
therefore the imposition of a National Treatment-like provision that requires each regulating country
to choose the same FRAND terms for all of its domestic patents, regardless of ownership or where
they are used for production and consumption. Each country would now impose the same regulation
throughout its economy. CA would choose mA = mX1 = mY 1, and CB would choose mB = mX2 =
mY 2, so as to:
max
mA
V AX(rX(m
A,mB)) + V AY (rY (m
A,mB)) (30)
max
mB
V BX(rX(m
A,mB)) + V BY (rY (m
A,mB))
Due to the symmetry of the industries, V AY (rY 1, rY 2) ≡ V BX(rX1, rX2). So each competition
authority eﬀectively chooses its regulation to maximize joint welfare–the solution to (30) will
be the same as the solution to (27)–implying that this National Treatment obligation in this
special case with complete symmetry implements the jointly eﬃcient outcome. Intuitively, absent
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the National Treatment provision the two industries are economically separate, implying that CA’s
decision problem for industry X is fully separate from its problem for industry Y. But the obligation
ties together the two decision problems. Of course, each authority still disregards the impact of
its decision for the other country. But with the obligation each authority will take into account
the eﬀects of its decision both with regard to the industry where it is an importer and where it
is an exporter. When the countries are mirror images each competition authority will eﬀectively
maximize welfare with respect to the instrument it controls for an economy that is a replica of the
other country.
Finally, in case the Eﬀects Principle is used to allocate jurisdiction (or if there are no rules
governing jurisdiction), the National Treatment provision would request each competition authority
to set one regulation for all four SEPs. But the increase in the number of commitments that
each authority regulates will not aﬀect the outcome, since the authorities are still constrained by
the National Treatment obligation to choose one level only, and the objectives functions of the
authorities remain the same.
Proposition 7 A National Treatment obligation that applies across industries can implement the
jointly eﬃcient outcome if countries are fully symmetric, when countries are unconstrained by juris-
dictional rules, or allocate jurisdiction according to the Nationality Principle or the Eﬀects Principle.
6 Concluding discussion
It is becoming increasingly common for competition authorities to regulate the implementation of
FRAND commitments. The authorities do not find much guidance in the vague formal texts of the
FRAND commitments for the interpretation of whether SEP holders request too much for making
their technologies available to implementers. The authorities instead (implicitly or explicitly) have
to balance the two societal goals of providing incentives for innovators to developed new technologies,
and of making the technologies accessible to implementers at low cost.
The interpretation of FRAND commitments are very of concern to more than one country.
This raises question which national competition authority should regulate? There is no multilateral
agreement on the enforcement of the FRAND commitments for SEPs. At the same time, the
allocation of the jurisdiction over the enforcement of the FRAND commitments might diﬀer both
due to diﬀerences in regulatory philosophies, and–as has been the focus of this paper–due to
competition authorities’ pursuit of national objectives.
The purpose of the paper is to shed some light on the economic performance of three main bases
for jurisdiction that are identified in the Default Rules for jurisdiction in customary international
law, which bind all nations absent international agreements: the Territoriality Principles, Nation-
ality Principle, and the Eﬀects Principle. These principles are well-established in international law,
stemming from many years of interaction between states in a large number of diﬀerent areas. They
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apply also to the regulation of FRAND commitments. Little is known about the appropriateness
of these rules from an economic point of view, however. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first paper to compare the economic performance of these rules for allocating jurisdiction over the
regulation of FRAND commitments for SEPs.
The analysis rests on the assumption that national competition authorities pursue nationally
defined objectives that disregard to the interests of other competition authorities. The allocation
of jurisdiction over SEPs will therefore typically aﬀect implemented regulations. To capture im-
plications of allocating jurisdiction according to the Default Rules, and to determine whether any
of the principles performs better from a joint welfare perspective, the paper employs the simplest
possible model of an industry in which holders of SEPs negotiate license terms with a producer, and
where two countries are involved in diﬀerent parts of a production chain. The focus is mainly on the
Territoriality and Nationality Principles. The Eﬀects Principle, at least in its most extreme form,
imposes no limits on jurisdiction. This follows trivially from the fact that in an economic model,
any policy decision will typically aﬀect all objective functions. So strictly interpreted, the Eﬀects
Principle does not limit the exercise of jurisdiction. But both the Territoriality and the Nationality
Principles have more potential to limit the jurisdictional reach of the countries. It is not a foregone
conclusion that they will have such eﬀect, however. Each principle may give diﬀerent conclusions
with regard to jurisdiction depending on whether it is applied to acts, actors or objects. But we
have argued that it seems plausible that the Territoriality Principle give jurisdiction to the country
that issues the patents in question, while the Nationality Principle allocates jurisdiction according
to the nationalities of the SEP holders.
A general negative finding is that neither of the Default Rules implements a jointly eﬃcient
outcome. A basic shortcoming of the rules is that they do not induce regulating countries to
internalize the consequences of their decisions, but only select the country (or countries) that can
impose its desired regulation on the SEPs. The nature of the ineﬃciencies are summarized in Table
2:
Both SEPs A-owned Split ownership Both SEPs B-owned
Territoriality Principle mi > rJ m1 > rJ ,m2 < rJ mi < rJ
Nationality Principle mi > rJ mi > rJ mi > rJ
Eﬀects Principle mi < rJ mi < rJ mi < rJ
Table 2: The eﬃciency properties of the three jurisdictional bases
Hence, the Nationality Principle consistently yields too lenient enforcement of FRAND commit-
ments, while the Eﬀects Principle has the opposite implications. The Territoriality Principle gives
jurisdiction to the country that has issued the patents, and the ineﬃciency that results from this de-
pends on the distribution of the ownership of the SEP across countries. SEPs that are domestically-
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owned by the issuing country will be enforced too leniently, and conversely for foreign-owned patents.
Intuitively, when the ownership of the SEPs is split between the countries, the Territoriality Principle
has the virtue of allowing the same competition authority jurisdiction over both FRAND commit-
ments. But this authority will use this power to maximize its own welfare only, and the resulting
externalities will prevent the outcome from being jointly eﬃcient. With jurisdiction allocated ac-
cording to the Nationality Principle, there is no coordination between the choices of the regulations,
since each competition authority has jurisdiction over one of the patents. But on the other hand,
both objective functions are taken into consideration in the determination of the outcome.
The straightforward pattern that emerges from these findings is hence:
• Regulating countries will impose too lenient enforcement of its own SEPs, and too stringent
regulation of the other country’ SEP(s), when there is no overlap in jurisdiction; and
• There will be too stringent enforcement whenever jurisdiction is overlapping.
Another general and negative finding is that there seems to be no clear hierarchy among the
jurisdictional bases from an economic eﬃciency perspective. Indeed, there is no clear hierarchy even
in the linear version of the model, where the weight α that competition authorities attach to SEP
license revenues is the sole parameter through which diﬀerent outcomes can be generated. This
finding can perhaps be said to support the lack of such a hierarchy in international law.26
Finally, since the Default Rules will not suﬃce to implement an eﬃcient outcome, it is natural to
look for a negotiated solution to the international externality problems with FRAND enforcement.
One possibility would be to form an agreement that only specifies the allocation of jurisdiction, that
is, an agreement that only specifies a hierarchy among the bases in the Default Rules. As we have
seen above, such an agreement would have to specify diﬀerent jurisdictional bases depending on the
particular circumstances at hand, and would thus be diﬃcult to draft.
An alternative would be to form a comity agreement that delegates jurisdiction to the party
with greater interest in regulating. Such agreements exists in other areas of competition policy,
but are rare, and comity is also sometimes part of domestic law. But apart from having to address
the tricky question of how to measure "greater interest", a comity agreement has the drawback of
allocating jurisdiction to the party with the larger unilateral interest, not to the party that will
implement the higher joint welfare. There are therefore limits to the extent to which it can improve
the outcome.
A step toward more directly aﬀecting the level of regulation would be to include a National
Treatment obligation in an agreement that allocates jurisdiction. As we saw above, a National
26 It has been assumed throughout that the regulation that maximizes joint welfare allows for strictly positive fees,
but is more stringent than the outcome absent policy intervention. If the eﬃcient outcome were instead given by a
corner solution, one of the jurisdictional bases might be optimal; for instance, if the eﬃcient outcome is the strictest
possible regulation r¯ = (0, 0), allocating jurisdiction according to the Eﬀects Principle would implement the eﬃcient
outcome. But these corner solutions do not seem to be relevant from a practical point of view.
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Treatment provision will not have any bite if applied within an industry when jurisdiction is allocated
according to the Nationality Principle. But it can aﬀect the outcome when either of the Territoriality
Principle or the Eﬀects Principle prevails. It appears as if a National Treatment obligation would
have the largest likelihood of improving the outcome in cases where there are no rules governing
jurisdiction.
An even more ambitious solution would be to negotiate an international agreement on the level
of FRAND enforcement for any intervention. This agreement need not specify the allocation of
jurisdiction, other than perhaps to coordinate the interventions between the two authorities. But
it again appears very diﬃcult to draft such an agreement in practice.
To conclude, a rather neghative picture emerges from the analysis and discussion above: A
very large number of SEPs are of central concern internationally. The existing legal framework for
allocating jurisdiction over the enforcement of FRAND commitments for these SEPs will most likely
not implement economically eﬃcient outcomes. It also appears very diﬃcult to draft international
agreements to eﬀectively address these problems.
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A Appendix: A linear version of the model with split ownership
This Appendix employs the simplest possible linear version of the model above to verify the existence
of certain outcomes. It considers the case where the holder of SEP 1 is a national of country A,
and the holder of SEP 2 a country B national.
Consider first the product market competition stage. Let gross consumer welfare be
U˜(c) ≡ c− 1
2
c2 + y,
where 0 < c < 1 is consumption of the product of interest, and y is consumption of other products.
The associated demand is
D(p) = 1− p > 0 for p < 1,
where 0 < p < 1 is the price of the product.
For given license fees ri < 12 , the optimal producer price is given by
P (r) ≡ argmax
p
(p− r1 − r2)(1− p)
=
1
2
(1 + r1 + r2) .
since the SOC is always fulfilled. Equilibrium consumption thus
c =
1
2
(1− r1 − r2) > 0.
Disregarding the income term, the maximized consumer welfare is
U(r) =
1
8
(1− r1 + r2)2 ,
the maximized profit is
Π(r) =
1
4
(1− r1 − r2)2 ,
and license revenues are
Li(r) ≡ riD(P (r1, r2))
=
1
2
ri (1− r1 − r2) .
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A.1 Bargaining over license fees absent FRAND enforcement
The simultaneous negotiation over license fees yields the outcome given by
d
dr1
[L1(r)Π(r)] = 0,
d
dr2
[L2(r)Π(r)] = 0.
The SOCs are of the form
d2
dr2i
[Li(r)Π(r)] = −3
4
(1− 2r1 − r2) (1− r1 − r2) ,
and are thus fulfilled for ri < 13 as will be the case in what follows.
Consider the negotiation over r1, say. There are two solutions to the bargaining problem above:
r1 = 1 − r2 and r1 = 14 −
1
4r2. The former implies the maximized Nash product equals 0, and the
latter that it is strictly positive. Due to symmetry, the same apples identically to the negotiation
over r2. Hence the best reply functions for the two negotiations are
N i(rj) =
1
4
(1− rj).
It follows that
dr2
dr1

N1
= −4 < dr2
dr1

N2
= −1
4
< 0,
and that the market outcome with no FRAND enforcement is
r0 = (
1
5
,
1
5
).
A.2 Competition authorities
Assuming that CB disregards the profits of its producer, the objective function for the competition
authorities are
V A(r) ≡ U(r) + αL1(r),
V B(r) ≡ αL2(r),
and joint welfare is
W (r) ≡ V A(r) + V B(r).
The joint welfare fulfills assumption (8) since
W12 =
1
4
− α,
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which is negative for the relevant range of α (as will be seen).
Consider the jointly eﬃcient fees. Due to the symmetry, r1 = r2 = r. The SOC for joint eﬃciency
maximization is fulfilled iﬀ α < 14 :
Wii = 1− 4α.
Since W is convex for α < 14 , the solution is either r = 0 or r =
1
2 (the maximal feasible r), yielding
respectively W = 18 and W = 0, so r
J
i = 0 is jointly optimal in this case. For α > 14 there will be
an interior solution to the FOC W1 = 0, given by
r =
1
4
(
α− 12
α− 14
).
This is negative for 14 < α <
1
2 , implying r
J = 0 again. Finally, for 12 < α, the outcome that
maximizes W is given by the interior solution.
Assuming that the jointly optimal fees must respect the implementation constraint, r ≤ r0, the
jointly optimal fees are:
rJ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if α ≤ 12 ,
1
4
α− 1
2
α− 1
4
if 12 < α ≤
3
2 ,
1
5 if
3
2 < α.
The paper assumes throughout that 0 < rJ < r0. This here corresponds to assuming that
1
2 < α <
3
2 , which will be presumed to be fulfilled in what follows. The resulting maximal joint
welfare level is:
W J =
α2
8α− 2
The joint welfare resulting with no FRAND enforcement, in which case r0 = 15 , is
W 0 =
3
25
α+ 9
200
< W J .
A.3 Outcomes as a function of the allocation of jurisdiction
A.3.1 CA has exclusive jurisdiction over both licenses
CA prefers r2 = 0 regardless of r1:
V A2 = −
1
4
(1− r1 − r2 + 2αr1) < 0
V A is strictly concave in r1 (for the assumed range for α):
V A11 =
1
4
− α
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The interior solution to the FOC with respect to r1 is
r1 =
1
2
α− 12
α− 14

< 12
> 0
.
CA can implement m2 = 0, but cannot enforce higher r1 than what the negotiation gives, which for
m2 = 0 is N1(0) = 14 . Hence, the critical value of α for which the implementation constraint starts
to bite is given by
1
2
α− 12
α− 14
=
1
4
,
or α = 34 . The outcome is thus
rTP1 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1
2
α− 1
2
α− 1
4
if 12 < α ≤
3
4 ,
1
4 if
3
4 < α <
3
2 ,
rTP2 = 0.
The resulting joint welfare will be
W TP =

α2
8α−2 if
1
2 < α ≤
3
4 ,
3
32α+
9
128 if
3
4 < α <
3
2 .
A.3.2 CA exercises jurisdiction over patent 1, CB over patent 2
Applying Lemma (11) to the present setting yields the implemented fees
r(m) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
m if m < (15 ,
1
5)
(m1,min(m2, N
2(m1)) if m1 < 15 and m2 >
1
5
(min(m1, N
1(m2),m2) if m1 > 15 and m2 <
1
5
r0 if m > (15 ,
1
5)
It was seen above that V A is strictly concave in r1. V B is also strictly concave in r2:
V B22 = −α
We can also confirm that V A12 < 0, in line with what is assumed in Section 4.1:
V A12 =
1
4
(1− 2α)
V B12 = −
1
2
α
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Disregarding the implementation constraint, the two FOCs
V A1 = 0
V B1 = 0
yield a candidate for a Nash equilibrium with both FOCs fulfilled as interior solutions:
r1 =
2α− 1
6α− 1 (A.1)
r2 =
2α
6α− 1
But since the maximal implementable r2 = N2(0) = 14 , and the above solution implies r2 >
1
3 , there
cannot be an equilibrium of this type.
The other alternative is that r2 = N2(r1). The optimal choice of m1 will then maximize
V A(r1, N
2(r1)) subject to the implementation constraint m1 = r1 ≤ r0. V A is strictly concave
in r1 since
V A11 =
3
64
(3− 16α)
is negative in the relevant range. There will not be an interior solution to CA’s problem however,
since evaluated at the maximal permitted value r1 = 15 ,
V A1 =
9
80
(2α− 1) > 0.
Consequently, the Nationality Principle has no bite in this case:
rNP1 = r
NP
2 =
1
5
The resulting welfare is
WNP =
9
200
+
3
25
α
Intuitively, the temptation for CA to drive down r2 through a lenient enforcement of the FRAND
commitment for its domestic SEP will be suﬃciently strong for CA to implement the maximal
feasible r1.
A.3.3 Both authorities exercise jurisdiction over both patents
With mi = 0, the outcome will be r = (0, 0), resulting in welfare
WEP =
1
8
.
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A.3.4 National Treatment within an industry
Suppose CA has jurisdiction over both SEPs (by virtue of the Territoriality Principle), but is
constrained by a National Treatment provision requesting r2 = r1. The problem facing CA is thus
max
r
V A(r, r)
s.t. r ≤ r0
V A is strictly concave in r:
d2
dr2
V A(r, r) = 1− 2α
The interior solution to the FOC
d
dr
V A(r, r) = 0
is
r =
α− 1
4α− 2
However, this is negative for 12 < α < 1, so m
NT = r = 0 for this range. At the maximally allowed
α = 32 the license common license fee is r
NT = 18 .
In sum:
rNT =

0 if 12 < α ≤ 1
α−1
4α−2 if 1 < α ≤
3
2
with the resulting welfare
WNT =

1
8 if
1
2 < α ≤ 1
1
8
(4α−3)α2
(2α−1)2 if 1 < α ≤
3
2
So far we have assumed that the Territoriality Principle gives CA exclusive jurisdiction over both
SEPs. If NT were instead imposed in a situation where no jurisdictional principles are employed, it
would constrain CA in the same fashion that we have just seen. It would also constrain CB, since
CB prefers a positive fee for its domestically-owned SEP, and a zero fee for the foreign-owned SEP.
CB would prefer r1 = r2 = 14 . But this cannot be implemented, so the imposition of NT would
induce CB to abstain from regulating (or equivalently set m = 15). Consequently, imposing NT in
a situation where no jurisdictional rules are applied, would take the outcome from r = (0, 0) to
r = (rNT , rNT ).
A.4 Comparing joint welfare
We plot joint welfare as a function of α for the various cases as follows:
• W 0 =WNat thick solid;
• W J thick dash;
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• W TP thin solid;
• WED thick dots; and
• WNT medium dash.
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.22
x
y
Hence:
• The best regime from a joint welfare perspective is the Territoriality Principle for 12 < α <
27
28 , and the unregulated market (or the Nationality Principle, since it implements the same
outcome) for 2728 < α <
3
2 .
• The National Treatment provision reduces joint welfare relative to the Territoriality Principle,
and to the extent it aﬀects the outcome, improves joint welfare relative to situation where
both countries regulate both SEPs.
42
Henrik Horn
B References
ALI (1987). Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States. American Law
Institute, Philadelphia, USA.
ALI (2018). Restatement (Fourth) Foreign Relations Law of the United States. American Law
Institute, Philadelphia, USA.
Bradford, Anu, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Jonathon Zytnick (2017). Is EU Merger Control Used
for Protectionism? An Empirical Analysis. Journal for Empirical Legal Studies 14(4), December.
Choi, Jay P. (2014). FRAND Royalties and Injunctions for Standard Essential Patents. CESIfo
Working Paper Series No. 5012.
Contrera, Jorge L. (2019). Technical Standard, Standards-Setting Organizations and Intel-
lectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches). In
Menell, Peter S. and David Schwartz (eds), Research Handbooks on the Economics of Intellec-
tual Property Law, Vol 2 - Analytical Methods, Edward Elgar (forthcoming). Available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2900540
Drahozal, Christopher R. (2014). Some Observations on the Economics of Comity. In Eger,
Thomas and Stefan Voigt (eds) The Economic Analysis of International Law, Mohr Siebeck. Avail-
able at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2101400.
Erixon, Fredrik and Matthias Bauer (2017). Standard Essential Patents and the Quest for Faster
Diﬀusion of Technology. ECIPE Policy Brief No. 4.
Froeb, Luke M., Bernard Ganglmeir, and Gregory J. Werden (2012). Patent Hold Up and
Antitrust: How a Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation. Journal of Industrial Economics
60(2), 249-273.
Garcia, Filomena, Jose Manuel Paz y Miño, and Gustavo Torrens (2018). Nationalistic Bias in
Collusion Prosecution: The Case for International Antitrust Agreements. December. Available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943073.
Horn, Henrik and Asher Wolinsky (1988a). Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unioniza-
tion. The Economic Journal 98, 484-497.
Horn, Henrik and Asher Wolinsky (1988b). Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger.
RAND Journal of Economics 19, 408-419.
43
International Jurisdiction over Standard-Essential Patents
Hovenkamp, Herbert (2020). FRAND and Antitrust. Cornell Law Review (forthcoming). Avail-
able at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3420925.
Langus, Gregor, Vilen Lipatov and Damien J. Neven (2013). Standard-Essential Patents: Who
is Really Holding Up (and When)? Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 253-284.
Lerner, Josh and Jean Tirole (2015). Standard-Essential Patents. Journal of Political Economy
123(3), 547-586.
Layne-Farrar, Anne (2017). The Economics of FRAND. In Blair, Roger D. and D. Daniel Sokol
(eds), The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech, Cambridge
University Press, 58-78.
Lundstedt, Lydia (2016). Territoriality in Intellectual Property Law. Department of Law, Stock-
holm University.
Mariniello, Mario, Damien Neven, and Jorge Padilla (2015). Antitrust, Regulatory Capture,
and Economic Integration. E15Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable
Development and World Economic Forum.
Padilla, Jorge, Douglas H. Ginsburg, and Koren W. Wong-Ervin (2018). Antitrust Analysis In-
volving Intellectual Property and Standards: Implications from Economics. George Mason Law Re-
view 26(2). Available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-
2018-0055-d-0003-147694.pdf.
de Rassenfosse, Gaétan, Emilio Raiteri, and Rudi Bekkers (2018). Discrimination in the Patent
System: Evidence from Standard-Essential Patents. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
Spulber, Daniel F. (2019). Licensing Standard Essential Patents: Bargaining and Incentives to
Invent. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3338997.
Wong-Ervin, Koren W., Joshua D. Wright, Bruce H. Kobayashi, and Douglas H. Ginsburg
(2016). Extra-Jurisdictional Remedies Involving Patent Licensing. Competition Policy Interna-
tional 12(2). Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2870505.
44
Henrik Horn
 
 
 
Author contacts: 
 
Henrik Horn 
Professor of International Economics 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) 
Stockholm 
SWEDEN 
 
Email: henrik.horn@econ-law.se 
 
 
 
